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Introduction
The above citations epitomize the position of the recent academic scholarship on the determinants of civil war onset, especially with regard to the role of social fractionalization. While Fearon and Laitin fail to find any robustly significant association between social fractionalization and the hazard of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler results are even more striking. They find that, when controlling for ethnic dominance, social fractionalization actually reduces such risk. Moreover, according to the recent literature, the other notable insignificant factor is democracy. In general, grievance motives of the onset of civil wars (ethnic / religious fractionalization, democracy / autocracy) have received only weak and inconsistent support in the literature. Instead, and despite the very different theoretical underpinnings adopted by the above two leading research teams, their empirical findings are broadly similar with regard to the role of non-grievance factors. A high risk of civil war was found to be robustly associated with low and stagnating income, high dependence on natural resources and other insurgency promoting environmental and demographic factors, such as high and sparsely dispersed population or rough geographic terrain.
Despite what appears to be compelling empirical evidence, there is hardly a consensus, partly because the evidence is at odds with a large body of theoretical literature, as well as with the conventional wisdom held by politicians and journalists. 1 Moreover, civil wars are far too important for the scientific and development community to close the debate on the causes of civil conflict and some strands of the empirical literature attempt to subject this evidence to further scrutiny. For example, focusing on identity wars only, Sambanis 2001 finds a significant and positive effect for ethnic heterogeneity. Other research looks into the mechanics of how ethnic and religious factors should work: for example, whether we should expect ethnic and religious factors to affect conflict through polarization or fractionalization; and ethnic polarization was found to be robustly associated with increased risks of both prevalence and onset of civil wars (Reynal-Querol 2002) . wars, different time periods of data availability, and the unreliability of (imputed) data for some of the newly established states.
Against this backdrop our paper constitutes a major departure from the prevailing empirical and theoretical literature. We take a different and, to our best knowledge, a new line of inquiry, which embeds the study of civil war in a more general analysis of varieties of violent conflicts within the borders of the state. Empirically, other possible manifestations of irregular and violent contestation of political power are coups and riots or low intensity conflict. Our approach, we argue, will have important implications for how we think theoretically about the occurrence of domestic war as well as how we specify our empirical tests. It will also have important implications for what we think the benchmark for our analyses should be, i.e. for what we think defines periods of peace as opposed to conflict. Further, thinking about political conflict in general will allow some probing into the dynamic of conflict escalation.
The older quantitative literature on violence pays little attention to the types of violence, how they are causally different and how they lead to different outcomes (Mueller and Weede 1990) . The more recent literature on civil wars, however, completely divorces the war outcome from the overall phenomenon of political violence. 2 The literature implies that civil war is not an outcome that can be neatly isolated in our analytical work, but few studies have undertaken a serious theoretical and empirical analysis of organized political violence (Sambanis 2006 on terrorism is an exception). For example, embedding the study of civil war into the larger process of organized political violence is consistent with Fearon's (2004, pp. 289) view that "both coups and peripheral insurgencies are strategies for using violence to take power." However, similar to the recent literature, Fearon is interested only in those coups that have de facto developed into civil wars, though the potential exists for all coups (attempted or successful) to grow into a large-scale war. In addition, to the extent that violence escalates from low to high levels (e.g. Sambanis, 2004; Reagan and Norton, 2005; O'Brien, 2002) , lower levels of violence can be thought of as yet another non-peaceful strategy to press for political change. Finally, Sambanis 2004 reviews the main approaches and results of the study of civil war. Supporting the importance of our approach, Sambanis notes: "If we cannot understand why we get civil war instead of other forms of organized political violence, then we do not understand civil war at all" (Abstract). He goes on to write that: "For many countries caught in a conflict trap, civil war is a phase in the cycle of violence. By isolating civil war in quantitative studies, we choose to focus on an event rather than a process, and we discard a lot of useful information that explains how we end up having a civil war" (pp. 268).
In our theory section we show that the combinations of low income (or major shocks to the economy) and low standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violence, regardless of the social characteristics of a society and for all types of political violence. Further we argue that because existing lines of identity and contestation will provide motivational and informational advantages to potential rebel leaders to grow a rebel organization, social fractionalization will be most likely associated with civil war. Also, fractionalization does not necessarily affect coup and low intensity violence, because coups require other type of organizational advantages (insider presence in the police and military) and lower levels of violence tend to be more random and lack coherent organization.
Subscribing to this simple and, hopefully, intuitive theoretical framework, our paper uses a multinomial logit empirical specification, in which the manifestations of violence range from lower intensity armed violence to coups and civil wars. If civil war is just one of the alternative expressions of violent contestation of political power, a multinomial model is more appropriate than the use of logit or probit models. Also, a multinomial framework is more appropriate than a bivariate model of domestic conflict (civil war, coups and armed violence lumped together) because it recognizes that different forms of conflict may have different determinants (Reagan and Norton 2005, O'Brien 2002) . To investigate the determinants of conflict, we estimate a family of encompassing multinomial regressions using a global database from 1950 to 1999, accounting for three types of domestic violence (civil wars, coups and other violent outcomes) as well as a host of "grievance" and "opportunity" variables commonly analyzed in the recent empirical literature.
Theory
We argue that civil war is but one, albeit extreme, manifestation of a continuum of conflicts within a society that could also take the shape of cooperative or non-cooperative but peaceful outcome as well as violent non-cooperative outcomes. In addition to civil war, the latter would include coups as well as violent riots, demonstrations and uprisings. We try to justify this view of conflicts by addressing ). Society members from both groups have equal shares (z =Z/N) from the aggregate common wealth (Z). We use a follow-leader game, where group A makes the first move on whether or not to mount an opportunistic grab on the common resource Z and internalize the benefits to its members only.
However, unlike Caselli and Coleman, we do not rule out that the weaker group (B) might choose to fight, which will result in conflict. Moreover, we assume that the decision by group B on whether to fight or to capitulate depends on its prior about the probability that group A would mount an opportunistic grab on Z, which is given by the extent of ethnic fractionalization in society (π ). Also unlike Caselli and Coleman, we assume that if group B decides to capitulate the ex-post outcome will depend on the strength of society's institutions for conflict management (in short democracy). Under well-established democratic rules, groups will eventually be forced to play by the rules and the common resource (net of the cost of conflict) will be equally distributed among all members of the society. On the other hand, when such institutions are weak, all of Z (net of the cost of conflicts) will be expropriated by group A. Moreover, the strength of conflict management institutions tends to moderate the potential inequities arising from the symmetric claims. This feature of the model borrows from Rodrik 1998 , who develops a model of social conflicts arising from coordination failure, with two social groups acting independently and facing a shrinking pie as a result of an external shock. In the Rodrik model, depending on a prior opinion about whether the rival group is likely to be "cooperative", each group will attach a high probability to an opportunistic grab of resources by its rival. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the game results in higher claims than available resources, leading to distributional conflicts and strong conflict management institutions moderate the conflict arising from the symmetric claims by credible rules that govern the ex post distribution of resources.
We specify the per capita pay-off for each group under the peace-peace (PP); conflict-conflict (CC) and conflict-capitulation (CP) outcomes: Where, for simplicity, we assume the cost of conflict to be the same when group B decides either to fight or capitulate in response to a conflictive move by group A.
4 Accounting for the ex-ante perception by group B on whether or not group A will mount an opportunistic grab (respectively given by π and π − 1 ), we can derive the expected payoffs of peace (P) and of conflict (C) strategies for each group (See Figure) .
Group A Strategy:
The expected value of peace for this group happens with probability 1 because group B (the weaker group) is assumed to prefer peace; conditional on group A's decision to avoid wresting control of the common assets Z. Therefore, it is simply given by:
On the other hand, the expected value of conflict for group A would depend on group B' reaction as well as the strength of the prevailing institutions for mediating conflicts: By using the expressions in (2.1)-(3) in (4) and collecting terms we have:
Proposition 1: for Group A the conflict strategy will dominate if and only if:
For group B the expected value of peace would depend on group A's strategy as well as well as the strength of the prevailing institutions, should group A chose to mount a grab on the appropriable assets (Z):
As before, using the expressions in (2.1)-(3) in (8) and collecting terms we have:
On the other hand, the expected value of conflict for the case B is conditional on group A choosing to mount a grab on Z. Therefore, it is simply given by:
Proposition 2: for Group B the conflict strategy will dominate if and only if: ); and that when the prevailing institution for conflict management is weaker than the minimum of the two reservation levels, conflict will be the dominant strategy for both groups.
Proposition 5: Characterizing the functional dependence of the reservation weights (associated with the reservation institutional setting for groups A and B) suggests the following (7.3 & 11. 3):
• The higher the intensity of violence (as reflected by the extent of destruction of assetsδ ) the weaker the reservation institutions required by both groups, i.e. the higher
This result suggests that onset of civil wars might require much weaker institutions than coups; and that other forms of low-intensity violence might happen even in the presence of strong institutions.
• The larger the weight of human capital and other types of non-appropriable assets relative to the common appropriable one ( This follows because for group A the gain from the resource grab will be small relative to the forgone non-appropriable income due to the destruction effect. However, if institutions are so weak and it chooses to initiate a conflict, the likelihood of an equitable ex-post distribution of Z will be very small, thus making the expected payoff large enough to favor a conflict strategy. On the other hand, for group B a very low weight for asset Z will make a capitulation strategy that avoids violent conflict more attractive than contesting an opportunistic grab by group A, unless institutions are so weak to the extent that the likelihood for an equitable ex-post distribution of Z is very remote. In this case the payoff for B from a conflict strategy could be higher.
• When group B is too small relative to A, the latter is less likely to initiate a conflict by attempting to wrest control of Z unless institutions are extremely weak.
This result follows because the per capita gain for group A from this grab will be too small, unless institutions are weak enough to ensure that, ex-post, it can deprive group B from all or most of the Z assets.
• Group A's reservation level will be higher the more fractionalized the society (i.e. highπ ); while group B's level will be lower.
In societies with high latent social conflicts, group B is likely to contest a conflictive opportunistic grab of assets Z on the part of group A. This will mean that the payoffs for A from the conflict strategy will be smaller unless countered by the effect of sufficiently weak institutions that would minimize the chance for an ex-post equitable distribution of Z. On the other hand, high degree of "latent" conflict would reduce the payoff for B from capitulation to group A's conflictive strategy unless compensated by relatively strong institutions that would increase the chances of an ex-post equitable distribution of Z.
To summarize, the above model provides a theory for grievance factors, namely social fractionalization and democracy, as determinants of political violence. Moreover, our model illuminates the interaction between these grievance factors and non-appropriable income and natural resources. The latter two "economistic" correlates have been the main stable of the recent large N empirical models of the risk of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003) . Our theory, therefore, suggest that both grievance as well as economic factors are relevant to the analysis of political violence. The failure of the civil war empirical literature to account for this theory, we will argue, is the failure of this literature to model civil war as part of an evolving process of political violence. Having analyzed the factors determining political conflict in general, next we discuss a set of hypotheses on the manifestation of political violence, namely riots/uprising, coups, and civil wars.
2.2
What are the factors that favor certain type of conflicts?
From the above model we infer that the combinations of low incomes (or major shocks to the economy) and low standards of democracy are likely to be associated with high probability of violent conflict, regardless of the social characteristics of a society.
Higher income per capita will decrease all violent and irregular contestation of political power, but will have the strongest effect on civil war. In the literature, high income reduces the risk of civil war both because richer states have a greater capacity to react to nascent rebellions (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and because in richer states the opportunity costs of rebellion are larger (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) . Coups d'etat on the other hand are likely to be affected by income per capita only to the extent to which it proxies the capacity of the central government for administration, policing and control of the military (Londregan and Poole 1990) . Further, Regan and Norton 2005 argue that initial mobilization and low levels of violence involve low costs and low levels of repression from the government. They also suggest that no side payments may be needed and grievance may be enough to observe low levels of violence. If government reaction to low levels of violence is not on a massive scale, then per capita income levels as a measure of government reaction capacity is not highly relevant.
If grievance factors are sufficient to observe low levels of violence (Reagan and Norton 2005) , then democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict associated with it are strongly related with lower levels of violent protest (Tilly 2003) . We also expect a strong relationship between democracy and fewer coups d'etat as the lack of legitimacy of a current regime makes coups more likely (Belkin and Shoefer 2003). Reagan and Norton 2005 argue that a full-scale revolt equivalent to civil war has high costs and there is expectation of government repression. This leads to the need for rebel leaders to provide selective benefits. Still, in democratic societies the use of violence or threats of violence is considered illegitimate as a means of resolving conflicts and democratic institutions and norms seek to replace force with peaceful mechanisms such as voting and the courts. Our expectation is then that credible democracy reduces the likelihood of civil war as well. However, we suggest that the effect will be weaker since state repression may require side payments in addition to grievance motives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Reagan and Norton 2005) . Following is the first testable hypothesis:
H1: Low income per capita and weak institutional capacity for conflict management (i.e. lack of functioning democracy) are associated with violent conflict.
Next, we address what determine the type of violence, given that a society or a country is inherently prone to violence. We argue that for each type of violence there are certain "opportunities" or "favorable" conditions that determine the manifestation of violence in one type or another.
While rebel groups in civil wars do not need a very large number of members as support basis (Fearon and Laitin) they still need a level of support that would make them transcend the status of a terrorist network, or of an unorganized mob. Gurr 2000 notes that mobilization depends on the availability of collective identities, shared motivations, and opportunities for collective action. We hypothesize that because of the kind of entrenched, built-in support rebels can find within ethnic, religious, or language groups, large-scale civil wars will tend to develop in socially fractionalized societies. Socioeconomic grievance (Gellner 1983) If our analysis is correct, the following hypotheses follow: 
A Multinomial Model of Conflict
In our theoretical account, armed conflict, coups and civil war are specific, alternative outcomes of an underlying weak state structure that is unable to solve peacefully, credibly and forcefully conflicts among various groups. To test this view of domestic conflict we need a multinomial model. That is we need to specify a model compatible with a single decision being made amongst more alternatives as opposed to a model that is the solution to a problem in which there are several decisions, each between two alternatives (Green 2003, pp. 719) . Obviously, war, coups or riots are not choices, but outcomes of the interaction of the different domestic societal actors. Applying Green's terminology of choices and decisions to our theoretical problem, we need a model that is able to encompass the realization of specific outcomes of the same propensity for civil strife.
The Multinomial Logit Model
As the estimation method, we choose an unordered multinomial logit model with four outcomes:
violent riots/uprisings, coups, civil war and a "peace" or "no new conflict" outcome (the reference category). A series of binomial logit regressions side by side can be specified instead of a multinomial. 5 However, in order to compare the effect of the independent variables on alternative outcomes, the binomial logit regressions need to have the same reference category (the 0 outcome in the dependent variable). Reagan and Norton (2005) write that they "view civil conflict as a process that has discrete levels or breakpoints. These begin with low levels of protest and proceed through higher levels of rebellion and, finally, if not sufficiently addressed, to civil war" (pp.326). This view of civil conflict is similar to our own description of armed conflict, coups and civil wars as alternative manifestations of non-peaceful political contestation. In terms of the research design, Reagan and
Norton study the determinants of civil wars in a logit regression in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for all country years of war incidence. All other data points are coded as the reference outcome 0. The reference category for civil war then includes instances of peace, protest and rebellion. Further, for the logit regression on rebellion outcomes, the reference category for rebellion includes peace, protest and war. Given the lack of a common reference category for the three civil conflict outcomes, it is inappropriate to interpret the results in a comparative fashion.
Further, if all the alternative manifestations of conflict have some common determinants, then it is likely that a multinomial model will be able to identify the common determinants better than a simple probit or logit on the civil war outcome. In particular, the multinomial setting allows easy testing of hypotheses regarding the size of estimated coefficients for variables of interest for all three outcomes:
riots, coups, civil wars.
The benefits of the multinomial logit are that it is inexpensive to estimate, and the formula for the logit probabilities is easy to interpret when compared to other choice models (Train 1993) . The one weakness of the multinomial logit is the assumption that the random disturbance terms in the equations for each alternative are identically and independently distributed in accordance with the extreme value distribution. This assumption (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) is inappropriate when the disturbances of a subset of the outcomes are correlated due to some similar unobservable characteristics or omitted variables. Possible remedial methods that we also try are the estimation of a nested logit (selective relaxation of the IIA assumption) or a multinomial probit (correlation of disturbance is allowed across the board). Substantively, the assumption of the nested logit that the error terms for the war, coup and armed violence outcomes are correlated is very attractive. Theoretically, it is likely that the three types of onset of domestic conflict are correlated through some unobservable factors, or factors that we are unable to measure. However, upon estimating variants of the nested logit model, likelihood ratio tests are unable to support the use of the nested logit versus the simpler multinomial logit. Finally, the results of our multinominal logit models are robust to running a multinomial probit instead.
Data The Dependent Variable
The To operationalize low intensity organized violence we use the variable riots from the CNTS Data
Archive. Riots are defined as any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force. For each year the original data sets counts the total number of riots that has occurred in that particular year. Most countries experience no riots (83% of country years) and less than 5% of country years have more than two riots each year. There are some outliers still: For example, in 1967 the US is documented with 55 riots, and India with 29. We transform the original riot data into a binary variable, taking the value of 1 for country years with riots and 0 for country years with no riots.
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For constructing a multinomial dependent variable we need to decide on how to treat country that experience multiple outcomes in a particular year. For example, El Salvador experienced a successful coup in 1979, which is also the year the civil war has started. Pakistan in 1971 experienced both a coup and the onset of a civil war. Also, Argentina saw both riots and a successful coup d 'etat in 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971 and 1976 . While our outcomes are not ordered to the extent that we could estimate an ordered probit model, there is still a gradation in the amount of damage our outcomes inflict both on the legitimacy of the political process and on people's lives. 8 We rank war as the most damaging outcome, followed by coups and then riots. Thus, if a country experienced either a coup or riots and the onset of a war in the same year we code the multinomial alternative as a war. Also, if a country experienced both riots and a coup we code the multinomial alternative as a coup. The multinomial dependent variable, then, has 144 war onsets, 319 coups and 1064 years with low intensity conflict.
Independent Variables
The Democracy; Anocracy; Autocracy Our novel theoretical approach to the study of violence is accompanied by a strong interest in reassessing the role that grievance factors -social fractionalization and lack of a fully functional democracy-play in the onset of political violence. We investigate the effect of democratic governance and practices on political violence by using a more nuanced operationalization of democracy than the literature on civil wars has done so far. We use the typology of democracy put forward by Goldstone et al.2005 in their study of political instability. Specifically, we follow Goldstone et al. and rely on two underlying components of the Polity score: The measure of executive recruitment (exrec) and the competitiveness of political participation (parcomp). 9 A 7 The riot variable from CNTS Data Archive is less than ideal. We would prefer to be able to discriminate between large and small violent clashes or demonstrations, but, to our knowledge, no such variable is readily available. 8 We do not use an ordered model because due to the nature of the data, events in two of our categories -riots and coups -are relatively heterogeneous. 9 There are multiple criticisms of the use of Polity IV -10 to 10 scale: Goldstone et al. discover that working with the components of the Polity IV scale better predicts instances of political instability. Gleditsch and Ward 1997 argue that the -10 to 10 scale should not be treated as a cardinal, or even as an ordinal measure.
combination of these two components has the best predictive ability in Goldstone et al. and, moreover, reflects the degree to which the political system allows societal actors to translate their preferences into policy with the help of peaceful mechanisms such as voting and elections. The upshot is that meaningful elections will decrease the appeal of violent means of political contestation. 
Econometric Results
In Table 1 we show the effect of political regime, social fractionalization on the onset of conflict. We further investigate the effect of polarization in Table 3 (Appendix), and the robustness to an alternative definition of civil war in Table 4 (Appendix). The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for the onset of violent demonstrations, the value of 2 for coups, the value of 3 for the onset of civil wars and the value of 0 for periods with no new conflict. The results for the independent variables are displayed distinctly for our three alternatives of domestic conflict: armed violence, coups and civil war. Also, the effect of the each measure of social diversity (ethnic, religious, language) is determined in separate models. The results that we present come from a multinomial logit model, but are robust to a multinomial probit specification that allows for the correlation of the unobserved 10 In general the literature abstracts from controlling for neighborhood effects (except Murdoch and Sandler 2004) . One can imagine that war in a neighboring country will lower the economic prospects of that country, leading to migration and refugees, which will then worsen prospects in the domestic country, leading to increased chances of war. Similar to much of the literature, we control directly for many of the potential consequences of wars in neighboring countries (income, population, instability), and thus mitigate the effect of not directly controlling for neighborhood effects.
disturbances across outcomes. Because we estimate the effect of the history of conflict, the estimation samples have 125 countries and go from 1951 to 1999.
Generally, our results confirm the stylized facts of the empirical literature. We find broad support for the hypothesis that richer countries experience less irregular and violent contestation of political power. Countries with higher per capita income display a lower chance of spiraling into civil war or experiencing a coup. Across our models, the effect is statistically significant for both coups and civil wars and substantively important: A move from the bottom 25 th percentile in terms of GDP/capita to the 75 th percentile reduces the chances of a country experiencing a coup by about 30% and the chances of civil war by 50%. The one year lagged value of income per capita does not appear to affect the likelihood of violence onset. This result may be an artifact of the fact that the identification of violence onset is not as precise as we would like it to be. We also find that populous countries are more prone to civil wars and violent demonstration, while at the same time being inconsequential for countries experiencing a coup. In our models, oil significantly increases the chances of civil war in most of our specifications while leaving unaffected the chances of a coup or lower intensity violence.
Other extractable resources ( Laitin interpret their findings as evidence that anocracies have a higher risk of war because they are weak, incoherent regimes. At the same time, the two authors dismiss the idea that democracies face a lower risk of civil war because of less discrimination and that autocracies also face a low risk of war because they specialize in repression (Hegre et al. 2001) . We believe Fearon and Laitin's interpretation to be speculative and that the Polity data affords further testing. In particular, we have the anocracy category unbundled into factional partial democracy, non-factional partial democracy, partial autocracy, and transition and interregnum periods. It is habitual for researchers to interpolate the Polity values for transition periods and code interregnum periods as anocracies (Polity score of 0).
This practice, however, results in a loss of information and potentially biased inferences. De facto, the practice results in assigning values characterizing normal politics to extraordinary periods that the Polity project researchers were reluctant or unable to place in their regular coding scheme.
In our regressions the reference category for the political regime dummy variables are autocracies.
Similar to Belkin and Schofer 2003 we find that democracies consistently reduce the chances for irregular takeover of power through coups. Democracy is also found to negatively affect the likelihood of observing violent demonstrations, although the negative effect is not robustly statistically significant. 11 The most important finding, however, is that democracies are less likely than autocracies to experience civil wars. The democracy coefficient is consistently negative and statistically significant or close to significance in many of our specifications. Moreover, while democracy has been shown in the literature to reduce chances for civil war when compared to anocracies or semi-democracies, it is novel to show that a credible democracy granting full political rights may reduce the risk of civil war more efficiently than a repressive autocracy. deeply factionalized competition. Our findings cast doubt on the idea that anocracies are weak states because they combine a generally unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features. Rather, the problem is a specific combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks rooted in traditional identities. Also, our findings point to potential grievance 11 Our expectation has been that democratic politics has the strongest effect on low levels of conflict -riots or violent demonstrations in our operationalization. (Tilly 2003 , Moore 1998 . 16 While we cannot distinguish among these explanations, our evidence suggests that countries with a history of violent protest are at risk of coups and escalation of violence into civil war.
Fractionalization and Polarization
In Table 1 In Table 3 (Appendix) we show the results for ethnic, religious and language polarization for each alternative manifestation of domestic conflict. All three aspects of polarization have a weak performance in our regressions, supporting the hypothesis of a monotonic relationship between 16 Tilly 2003 writes: "Not all scattered attacks, however, remain contained and segmented. In principle, we may expect salience and coordination to increase, if political entrepreneurs or violent specialists join the action on either side" (pp. 187) or (about El Salvador 1980) "though the demonstrations and strikes gradually became smaller, there was a concomitant shift within the left opposition toward a military strategy" (pp. 39). 17 We choose to present our results with only one measure of fractionalization included because of the way Fearon 2003 chooses to code ethnic groups, which includes sharing cultural features, such as a common language or religion.
ethnicity, religion, languages and domestic violent political conflict. 18 In Table 4 The interaction of ef and partial non-factional democracy is negative, and the interaction of ef and partial factional democracy is positive. While partial factional democracy was statistically significant in all of our previous specifications, in the interacted model it loses significance. A joint statistical significance test rejects the hypothesis that ef and all its interacted terms are indistinguishable from zero at the 10% probability level. The predicted probabilities of civil war from the interacted model are shown in Table 5 (Appendix). At low levels of ethnic fractionalization (25 th percentile) factional and non-factional partial democracies reveal a probability of civil war onset hovering around 2%.
For high levels of ethnic fractionalization (75 th percentile), non-factional partial democracies lower the probability of civil war onset to about 1.3%, while partial factional democracies increase the same probability to about 4.6%. Our results indicate that political liberalization with free and open elections is not a panacea and that, to insure peace, governments need to moderate favoritism and instead engage in a broad based society dialogue.
Social fractionalization
We test the robustness of our findings for fractionalization in Table 2 . Our purpose is to isolate the most fractionalized societies along both ethnic and language lines and test whether countries face a coordination problem in waging civil war. In particular, Collier wars (onset rate of 2.13%). Table 2 shows the results from a multinomial logit that include measures of social fractionalization along both ethnic and language lines. Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler 2001, our results suggest that social fractionalization is not benign. The results for civil war show that ethnic and language diversity increase the chances that countries will experience domestic wars. The coefficient on diverse societies is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on homogenous societies is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, by looking at the predicted probabilities, a diverse country is twice more likely to experience civil war than a moderately diverse country and more than three times more likely than a homogenous country. Indeed, as Fearon and Laitin 1993 argue, it appears to be the case that rebel groups do not need large masses of people to start a bloody conflict and that the coordination problem posed by Collier and Hoeffler 2001 is not an important factor in the onset of civil war. Also, ethnic dominance continues to be statistically insignificant contradicting the idea that majorities (groups that make 45%-90% of the population) necessarily have the ability and the incentive to exploit minorities (Collier 2001 ) and the idea of preemptive civil war initiated by large ethnic groups facing moderately large ethnic minorities (Caselli and Coleman 2006) .
Conclusion
In this paper we start by assessing the empirical support received by grievance motives in the onset of civil wars (political regime and social fractionalization measures). By and large, the Collier-Hoeffler 2004 and Fearon-Laitin 2003 contend that ethnic and religious diversity do not have deleterious effects on the propensity societies have to solve conflicts violently. Fearon and Laitin also argue that anocracies are at a higher risk of war because they are incoherent, weak regimes combining features of both autocracies and democracies. We believe that the subject is worth further investigation and propose a theory of domestic conflict in which low level armed violence, coups and civil war are specific, alternative outcomes of an underlying propensity to solve political conflict in a violent manner. Our model provides a theory for grievance factors, namely social fractionalization and democracy, as determinants of political violence. Moreover, our model illuminates the interaction between these grievance factors and non-appropriable income and natural resources. Our theory suggests that both grievance as well as economic factors are relevant to the analysis of political violence. The failure of the civil war empirical literature to account for this theory, we will argue, is the failure of this literature to model civil war as part of an evolving process of political violence.
Faithful to our theoretical discussion, we specify and estimate a multinomial model of domestic conflict. If the alternative manifestations of conflict have some common determinants, then it is likely that a multinomial model will be able to better identify the common determinants better than a simple probit or logit on the civil war outcome. Also, a multinomial model recognizes that different forms of conflict may have different determinants.
Following a battery of estimations and robustness checks we find that: Not all anocracies are weak political regimes; Democracies may be more efficient than autocracies in reducing the risk of civil war; Not all political instability results in domestic war; Ethnic, religious and language diversity (fractionalization) increases the chances of civil wars; Ethnic and religious dominance or polarization do not affect civil war; Social fractionalization (ethnically and linguistically diverse societies) does not increase coordination costs for rebel groups but, rather, increases the likelihood of war.
To test the effect of political regime on the risk of violent conflict we use a typology of democracy based on the two components of the Polity score that deal with competitiveness of the political system at the leadership and mass levels. We identify full-fledged democracies, partial non-factional democracies, partial factional democracies, partial autocracies and full-blown autocratic regimes.
Our findings show that credible democratic regimes granting full political rights may reduce the risk of civil war more efficiently than repressive autocracy. We also find that countries most vulnerable to conflict, from violent demonstrations to coups and civil war are partial factional democracies, while partial non-factional democracies are not more risky than autocracies. This finding casts doubt on the idea that anocracies are weak states because they combine an unstable mix of democratic and autocratic features. Rather, we suggest that the problem is the combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled though networks rooted in traditional, ethnic identities.
Political instability has been found in the literature to increase the risk of civil war. Our empirical results challenge that finding and we suggest that specific types of instability are to blame. In particular, our results show that violent conflict is the result of extraordinary political instability of the kind that the Polity project researchers were unable to place in their regular coding scheme. We also show that the risk of civil war is increased by the political instability that results from a history of coups d'etat and a history of violent protests and demonstrations.
Finally, we find that ethnic, religious and language fractionalization significantly increases the likelihood of civil war. Ex ante we posited a grievance explanation to why fractionalization may increase the chances of civil war, while Laitin 2003 and Caselli and Coleman 2006 argue for the informational value of ethnicity. The unconditional effect of fractionalization cannot extend support to either mechanism in particular. However, we interact ethnic fractionalization with the two types of partial democracy that are the most likely outcomes from a democratic transition in the developing world: partial non-factional democracy and partial factional democracy. We find that partial democracy of the non-factional kind reduces the deleterious effects of fractionalization, while partial factional democracy exacerbates the effect of diversity. We interpret our findings as evidence that states with discriminatory policies face larger chances of war in socially diverse societies. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Results are robust if we include decade dummies or a cold war variable. Ethnic fractionalization remains statistically significant when including religious fractionalization, language fractionalization or the number of languages. If we use Reynal-Querol 's language fractionalization index it is statistically significant at the 10% level. We prefer using the number of languages as the measure is available for a larger sample. If included in the same regression model, both religious fractionalization and the number of languages are statistically significant. Lagged full democracy is significant at the 11% probability level in the civil war component of the Multinomial 1 model. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The reference category for regime dummy variables are autocracies. Polarization variables are not statistically significant even if we exclude measures of fractionalization. Note: The samples have 125 countries and go from 1951 to 1999. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The reference category for regime dummy variables are full autocracies. Factional partial democracies make 11% of observations and non-factional partial democracies about 9 %. Partial autocracies are about 6% of the sample. Autocracies make about 48% of the observations in the sample. Transitional regimes and irregular transfers make a little more than 3% of the sample.
